Regain de stress sur les marchés financiers

Pour l’heure, la performance des actifs risqués n’est pas trop entamée, y compris en Europe. Mais le sentiment du marché se dégrade si l’on en croit le dernier indicateur de Bank of America Merrill Lynch.

Source:  Bank of America Merrill Lynch

Source: Bank of America Merrill Lynch

[cleeng_content id= »710363306″ description= »Plus d\’analyses et de commentaires à découvrir… » price= »0.19″ t= »article » referral= »0.05″]En Europe, l’agenda politique a repris le dessus sur l’agenda économique ou sur celui des publications de résultats. Encore une fois pour les mauvaises raisons: l’Europe politique a le plus grand mal à donner un cadre de résolution des crises stable et à fixer un cap rassurant aux investisseurs – une situation que l’on semblait pourtant acquise depuis l’an dernier…

Mais les économistes Bank of America Merrill Lynch pensent qu’au-delà de la question chypriote, le cas de l’Espagne est lui aussi très préoccupant.

« In the euro area, it is the political rather than the seasonal calendar which is driving events. Elections in February paved the way for a new government in Cyprus to sit across the Troika at the bailout negotiating table. Shadowing this week’s heat on Cyprus to raise €5.8bn is another election: the September German polls. A probable Cyprus bailout – still our base case – has to be approved by parliaments in Germany and Finland. This underscores the high stakes and political motives surrounding the negotiations. As our FX strategist Thanos Vamvakidis explains, the decision to tax deposits in Cyprus was the least politically damaging option from the core’s perspective.
The situation in Cyprus remains fluid, but the slower-moving crisis in Spain remains key. As our European team highlights, the pressure on Spanish assets is likely to intensify by year-end as foreign investors curtail exposure amid the country’s large funding needs, the likely underperformance on the fiscal and reform fronts, and the risk of downgrades.
Although tempered by expectations of further ECB actions and stronger US growth, episodic risk flare-ups in Europe are likely weigh on market sentiment, in our view. »

La banque privilégie une situation qui devrait rester confuse un bon moment, plutôt qu’une sortie de Chypre de la zone euro.

« 1. Our central scenario is that of muddling through, with a painful deal being reached by the Troika, Cyprus and the possible participation of Russia. This would likely include some private sector participation. And it would likely have indirect but lasting consequences for other periphery countries, because the discussions would be likely to increase fragmentation again. Under that scenario, we would expect policymakers to focus on options to support credit in the South to overcome the renewed fragmentation impact.
Talks of a euro exit have resurfaced owing to difficult negotiations in Cyprus. In our view, this is possible, but much less likely than a muddling through scenario. In this piece we look at the potential options for Cyprus, implications for the euro area economy and possible policy responses.
2. An alternative scenario, to which we ascribe a smaller probability (though this would likely increase if negotiations were delayed), would be a default on private and/or public debt in Cyprus. In that scenario, when banks reopened, deposit flights would likely trigger bank insolvency and the ECB would veto ELA. As a result, banks would default and, since the sovereign is not in a position to nationalize the banks and cover the deposit insurance, it could default as well. The shock would likely be significant and the policy response would need to be commensurate. Talks of a Cyprus exit would then increase. »

Qu’envisager dans ce scénario noir ? Merrill ne prévoit pas de scénario à la Lehman, mais pense à une situation d’une moindre intensité, compte tenu de la situation dans le cycle économique et de la diminution de l’intégration financière.

« In ‘What if Greece exits the euro?’, we argued that under a Greek exit and disorderly default scenario, the shock to confidence in the euro area would be severe and we estimated euro area GDP would contract by 4% even with measures to avoid contagion. We benchmarked a Greek default and exit with the Lehman episode, given that we expected the uncertainty shock to be similar. We also took into account the extent of fiscal and monetary support.
In a Cypriot exit scenario, we would expect a significant uncertainty shock, but not as severe as in the Lehman situation, given that the economic cycle and leverage have changed markedly. Given economies’ positions in the cycle, the current level of inventories is much lower. And, financial integration and leverage has diminished. Overall, the shock would be more contained geographically and in magnitude, in our view, but would still be sizeable and only contained thanks to a major policy response. Consumption and investment would likely be particularly affected, albeit much less than in the Lehman episode, as investment is far from fully recovered across most euro area countries. However, we would expect a similar contraction in exports – because roughly half of euro area countries’ exports are directed to their euro partners.
Although putting a number to such an uncertain outcome is complicated, we use recent research to provide some guidance. According to this research, a one standard deviation increase in uncertainty is associated with a decline in output growth of between 0.4ppt and 1.25ppt. Assuming the uncertainty shock resembles that of Q4 2011 this would imply a headwind to our 2013 forecast of -0.5% of between -1% and -2.5%. In other words, we would expect a GDP contraction of between 1.5% and 3%, that is, a middle point below 2%.
What about the long run under this scenario? The special treatment of deposits and the imposition of semi-capital control would have the implicit effect of underlining the fragmentation between the North and the South. Once again, the lack of regard for capital structure when designing programmes could lead to the perception that restructuring in the Eurozone rests on arbitrary decisions, which would damage investment cases in the euro area, particularly in countries with pending deleveraging. »

[/cleeng_content]

Les commentaires sont fermés.